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ABSTRACT
Purpose. This research paper shows which value add measures are used by German 
DAX 30 corporations in their 2015 annual reports. It explains how different measures like 
shareholder value, economical value add (EVATM), return on capital employed (ROCE), 
return on equity (ROE) and others are calculated and how they correlate. Corporate gov-
ernance has been highly professionalized which clearly shows in the annual reports of all 
firms. The requirement for “sustainable creation of value” as stated in the German Corporate 
Governance Codex (Regierungskommision Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, 2015) is 
made transparent as a core element in the companies’ annual reports. 
Design. 70% of the DAX 30 firms show value add data and some of them even 
highlight that value add has been made part of their corporate management approach. In 
turn this means that 30% of the firms are not showing value add data in a prominent way. 
The paper focuses on the 70% showing value add data and how EVA, company specific 
EVA-like measures or ROCE are the most used ones. 
Findings. The paper shows that ROCE with a factor of 0,97 correlates best with EVA 
and in absence of an EVA calculation is the best measure to represent value creation.
Originality. As part of a dissertation the aim is to develop a best in class 
measurement system and comparison for corporate governance theoretical and empirical 
analyses. The paper has been presented at 21st European Scientific Conference of Doctoral 
Students - PEFnet2017 organized by the Faculty of Business and Economics of Mendel 
University in Brno, taking place on November 30, 2017 on the campus of Mendel University 
in Brno, Czech Republic. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
the objective of the first theoretical part of this paper is to identify and analyze 
financial measures against their usefulness to show financial value added as part of 
professionalizing corporate governance. the second part’s objective is to show, ana-
lyze and discuss which financial measures are actually used by the German daX 30 
corporations. an additional intention is to provide inputs from the learnings of this 
research to members of the board of directors or supervisory boards.
claessens and yurtoglu (2013) review research on corporate governance, with 
a special focus on emerging markets (claessens, yurtoglu, 2013). claessens and 
yurtoglu (2013) find that better corporate governance benefit firms through greater 
access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance, and more favorable 
treatment of all stakeholders (claessens, yurtoglu, 2013). lazonick and o’sullivan 
(2000) provide an historical analysis of the rise of shareholder value as a principle 
of corporate governance, lazonick and o’sullivan (2000) consider the performance 
of the us economy, and raise questions about the relation between the maximiza-
tion of shareholder value and the sustainability of economic prosperity (lazonick, 
o’sullivan, 2000).
Khan et. al., (2013) examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
the extent of corporate social responsibility (csr) disclosures (Khan et. al., 2013). 
Khan et. al., (2013) results suggest that although csr disclosures generally have a 
negative association with managerial ownership, such relationship becomes sig-
nificant and positive for export-oriented industries (Khan et. al., 2013), (michalski, 
2016). aguilera and Jackson (2003) develop a theoretical model to describe and ex-
plain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies (agu-
ilera, Jackson, 2003). model of (aguilera, Jackson, 2003) has strong implications for 
studying issues of international convergence (aguilera, Jackson, 2003).
liu and Zhang (2017) take chinese companies in heavy-pollution industries the 
relationships among corporate governance, social responsibility information disclo-
sure, and enterprise value (liu, Zhang, 2017). (liu, Zhang, 2017) find that there is a 
declining level of social responsibility information disclosure of listed enterprises in 
heavy-pollution industries (liu, Zhang, 2017). forbes and milliken (1999) develop a 
model of board processes by integrating the literature on boards of directors with the 
literature on group dynamics and workgroup effectiveness (forbes, milliken, 1999). 
croci et. al., (2017) examine minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in 
Germany. according to croci et. al., (2017) carry out the first detailed analysis of 
the German squeeze-out offers from the announcement to the outcome of post-
deal litigation. croci et. al., (2017) claim that large firms with foreign large share-
holders are the most likely to be delisted (croci et. al., 2017). baysinger and butler 
(1985) examined role of the board of directors in the theory of the firm and argue 
that the recognition of the governance and instrumental functions of individual 
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directors is an important element in developing a theory of corporate governance 
(baysinger, butler, 1985)
al-najjar, (2017) investigates the impact of board and ceo characteristics on 
ceo compensation (al-najjar, 2017). (al-najjar, 2017) indicate that board size, 
board independence and ceo age are important factors affecting ceo pay (al-naj-
jar, 2017). daily et. al., (2003) claims the field of corporate governance is at a cross-
roads (daily et. al., 2003). 
nuthall and old (2017) observe that family farming has been the dominant own-
ership and governance system in primary production. nuthall and old (2017) hy-
pothesised that the farmers’ personal characteristics play a major part in the choice, 
and continuance, of current ownership and governance systems. core et. al. (1999) 
find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount 
of cross-sectional variation in ceo compensation and (core et. al., 1999) suggest 
that ceos earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. 
(core et. al., 1999) find that firms with weaker governance structures have greater 
agency problems and greater compensation is paid to ceos at firms with greater 
agency problems (core et. al., 1999).
la porta et. al. (2000) describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of 
their enforcement across countries (la porta et. al., 2000), they also assess potential 
strategies of corporate governance reform. la porta et. al. (2000) argue that the legal 
approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance (la porta et. al., 
2000). shleifer and Vishny (1997) surveyed research on corporate governance, with 
special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership 
concentration in corporate governance systems around the world (shleifer, Vishny 
1997). in similar manner (shleifer, Vishny, 2007) surveyed research on corporate 
governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors 
and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world 
(shleifer, Vishny, 2007).
liu et. al., (2017) find that the media can play a role in corporate governance by 
influencing the value of ceos’ human capital (liu et. al., 2017). Jensen and meckling 
(1976) integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights 
and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm 
(Jensen, meckling, 1976). they define the concept of agency costs, show its relation-
ship to the control and separation issue, (Jensen, meckling, 1976) made research on 
the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity. 
apart from that Jensen and meckling (1976) demonstrate who bears costs agency and 
investigate the pareto optimality of existence agency costs during corporate govern-
ance process (Jensen, meckling, 1976). 
Kalodimos (2017) found that the effect of internal governance on performance 
is potentially economically significant but may be difficult to identify. Kalodimos 
(2017) claims that there is a case because of confounding external disciplinary mech-
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anisms and the endogenous choice of internal governance (Kalodimos, 2017). study 
of Kalodimos (2017) addresses those difficulties by using nonprofit (svidroňová 
et. al., 2016) hospitals (soltes, Gavurova, 2016) as an economic environment with 
muted external disciplinary mechanisms and instrumenting for internal govern-
ance using governance spillovers of geographically local public firms (Kalodimos, 
2017). Gompers et. al. (2003) constructed a Governance index by which they defined 
the level of shareholder rights at large firms. Gompers et. al. (2003) have found that 
investment strategy that bought firms to situation with strongest rights. in opposite 
manner sold firms were found as these which have weakest rights. that second group 
would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample pe-
riod. Gompers et. al. (2003) have found that firms with stronger shareholder rights 
had higher firm value growth and lower capital expenditures (Gompers et. al., 2003).
Hayat and Kabir Hassan, (2017) study the effect of an islamic label on corporate 
governance. according to observation of Hayat and Kabir Hassan (2017) listed firms 
with an islamic label are characterized by low leverage (Hayat, Kabir Hassan 2017). if 
leverage can act as a substitute for good governance according to Hayat, Kabir Has-
san (2017), and it means to them that it is basis for expectation that these islamic 
firms will have better governance than their non-islamic peers (Hayat, Kabir Hassan 
2017), although there is no significant difference in overall governance between is-
lamic and non-islamic firms (Hayat, Kabir Hassan 2017). and there is no significant 
effect of an islamic label. Hayat and Kabir Hassan (2017) find that an islamic label 
adds to governance quality, as measured by the score, but that is effect rather political 
correctness wishing thinking but not related to leverage or real differencess (Hayat, 
Kabir Hassan 2017). 
corporate governance has become more and more important over the past 15 
years. following local corporate governance guidelines and codices has become a de 
facto standard. this is made fully transparent in annual and corporate governance 
reports in today’s world of stock market listed firms. on top of that more and more 
firms not only document compliance, they use certain financial measures to make 
transparent their success of adding value to the company. Having stated that the im-
mediate question arises which is the most appropriate approach and which financial 
measures are best suited to reflect value add. While shareholder value in the mean-
time has a somewhat negative touch in the sense of being short-term and capital fo-
cused only, economic Value added (eVa) ™ seems to be the best known and often 
used measure applied by firms in recent years. the author believes that while eVa ™ 
on the one hand side is well if not best suited but on the other hand due to its con-
straints has limitations. therefore, that’s the hypothesis, there is not one consistent 
metric used between the firms yet.
corporate governance was institutionalized in the early 2000’s in several coun-
tries like in the united states with the sarbanes-oxley-act 2002 (“sarbanes-oxley 
act,” 2002) or in Germany with the German corporate Governance codex (GcGc). 
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the sarbanes-oxley act of 2002 (often shortened to sarbox or soX) is a legislation 
passed by the u.s. congress to protect shareholders and the general public from ac-
counting errors and fraudulent practices in the enterprise, as well as improve the 
accuracy of corporate disclosures. the u.s. securities and exchange commission 
(sec) administers the act, which sets deadlines for compliance and publishes rules 
on requirements. the German corporate Governance code “ …. presents essential 
statutory regulations for the management and supervision (governance) of German 
listed companies and contains internationally and nationally recognized standards 
for good and responsible governance. the code aims to make the German corporate 
Governance system transparent and understandable. its purpose is to promote the 
trust of international and national investors, customers, employees and the general 
public in the management and supervision of listed German stock corporations.
the code clarifies the obligation of the management board and the supervisory 
board to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustainable crea-
tion of value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy (interest 
of the enterprise).
a dual board system is prescribed by law for German stock corporations.” fur-
thermore “the code clarifies the obligation of the management board and the su-
pervisory board to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise and its sustain-
able creation of value in conformity with the principles of the social market economy 
(interest of the enterprise).”(regierungskommision deutscher corporate Govern-
ance Kodex, 2015)
this paper focuses on the so called “sustainable creation of value” and especially 
how it can be measured from a financial point of view. 
already in the mid nine-tees of the previous century Joel stern developed the 
economical Value added (eVa)™ approach (Joel stern et al., 1996) which was trade-
marked by stern stewart & co. this measure has been adopted by many companies 
ever since, however there are several other financial measures which are being used 
and need to be considered in this context. 
in this paper in the first step different financial measures eVa ™ are being 
identified, explained and evaluated including literature search. other considered 
financial measures besides eVa ™ are without particular order shareholder Value, 
return on assets roa, return on net assets rona, return on equity roe, return 
on capital employed roce, return on investment roi, cash flow, free cash flow, 
tobin’s Q as well as financial Value add and Value add. 
in a second step the annual reports of some of the German daX listed corpora-
tions are evaluated in order to find out whether a financial value add measure is used 
and if so which one it is. 
thereafter these measures are being discussed before a future outlook from the 
author concludes the paper.
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2. FINANCIAL MEASURES
the paper aims to judge financial measures towards their usefulness for the 
corporate governance objective to grow the financial value of a firm in a sustainable 
way. it intends to take the view from a board of director’s member who’s duty is to 
make sure value is added. it is not meant to provide a complete analysis of finan-
cial measures used in corporate balance sheets. also the author takes it as common 
knowledge that a singular financial measure cannot be reflective of the financial 
health of a company, which means even with a proper financial value add measure 
additional financial indicators need to be considered in order to get a full picture and 
judgement of a firm’s financial constitution at any given time (becker, 2013; brealey 
et al., 2015; Wöhe, 2016).
2.1. Economical Value Added EVA ™
as mentioned before eVa ™ has been developed by Joel stern and trademarked 
by stern stewart & co. stern raises high expectations stating that “ … eVa … is not 
just a performance measure. When fully implemented it is the centerpiece of an 
integrated financial management system that encompasses the full range of corpo-
rate financial decision making …. .” (Joel stern et al., 1996). While it might be a bit 
ambitious it at least has made its way into many corporate finance departments and 
boards as measure and indicator for financial value add throughout the years until 
today which we will see in the empirical research later in this paper. another author 
in an article claims “economic value added (eVa) uses accounting information to 
improve decisions and motivate employees.”(unknown, 2008), furthermore Joel 
stern emphasizes “eVa is not a metric but a way of thinking, a mindset.” (Joel stern 
et al., 1996)
German professor stefan Hilbert in an article xx says that while the shareholder 
value approach in principle is well suited as corporate management instrument, it 
has constraints as it is rather mathematical and difficult to communicate (Hilbert, 







roce = return on capital employed
Wacc = Weighted average cost of capital
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noa = net operating assets
nopat = net operating profit after taxes
the delta between roce and Wacc is the so called spread which if positive says 
that value was created, as then the return of the employed capital was higher than the 
costs to finance. prof.Hilbert cautions to simply use balance sheet data to calculate as 
it should be mandatory to use current market conditions for valuation to eliminate 
balance sheet effects for calculating asset values.
nopat is a company’s potential cash earnings if it had no depth. therefore, 
nopat is a more accurate look at operating efficiency for companies with depth, as it 
does not include the tax savings many companies get because of existing debt.
nevertheless, eVa can be used as value based management system for a firm or 
even within a firm for individual business units to compare performance. in order 
to do so the so called eVa decision tree as shown in below graph 1 serves as a very 
transparent instrument.













* NOPAT = Net Operating Profit After Tax
** contribution: profit contribution to fixed costs





















the downside of the eVa calculation and approach is that in order to boost eVa mid- 
to longterm investments can be reduced or abandoned resulting in short term actions and 
mindset with the risk of harming mid- and longterm term success. in addition the formula 
might show limited viability for companies with high intangible assets, such as small to 
mid-size high tech firms with several patents and high intellectual property (ip).  Knowing 
these shortcomings eVa still might be of very good use and an instrument also for 
the board of directors or supervisory board in combination with additional means 
and measures. this could be for example the governed execution of a strategic plan 
ensuring a balanced approach between short-, mid- and longterm investments. 
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2.3. Shareholder value
alfred rappaport often is seen as intellectual founder of shareholder value 
(rappaport, 1986). already in 1983 he published “ … the experience of companies 
that have implemented the shareholder value contribution criterion … is not only 
a conceptionally appealing performance standard, but a wholly operational one as 
well. …. should improve companies opportunities for creating economic value ….” 
(rappaport, 1983)
With Jack Welch’s increasing success as ceo of General electric corporation 
shareholder value became the synonym for financial success in corporate america in 
the 90’s and early 2000’s. in the meantime “…in vogue to dismiss the idea that cre-
ating shareholder value should be a ceo’s guiding objective. “ (mauboussin, 2011): 
He says that it is “a profound misunderstanding” that shareholders value manage-
ment is all about optimizing the stock price for the short term. in opposite it is “ to 
create value and then let the stock price reflect the value” (mauboussin, 2011). in his 
eyes “a ceo’s job is about resource allocation …. figuring out how to allocate human 
and financial capital to its best and highest use for the long term. Value creation, by 
means of maximizing long-term free cash flow, provides the appropriate approach to 
judge alternative strategies and subsequent performance.” there are two important 
points mentioned, one is the financial measure of long-term free cash flow, we come 
back to that shortly. the second one is value creation which he ties directly to long-
term free cash flow. this explains why cash flow is one of the key financial measures 
and indicators (dittmar and mahrt-smith, 2007). see also Hilbert’s calculation of 
shareholder Value (Hilbert, n.d.)
shareholder value (sHV) is the value of a firm which is left at the end of a busi-
ness cycle, after all debts have been paid. this money, the free cash flow(s) is for the 
shareholder(s). in financial terms it is the value of a company which is defined as the 
net present value (npV) of all future cashflows plus the value of the non-operating 
assets of the company less the future claims (debts). Where non-operating assets in-
clude for example marketable securities like stocks, excess real estate, overfunded 
pension plans. future claims are debts include for example short-term and long-
term interest bearing debt, capital lease obligations, underfunded pension plans, 
contingent liabilities.
sHV=corporate Value - debts (future claims) (3)
or
sHV=(npV+value of non - operating assets) debts (future claims) (4)









t1/tn = current and future years
i = interest rated with which future profits / cash flows are discounted 
¶ = (r-c)t = profit = revenue - cost , in a given year
fcf = future cash flow
tV = terminal Value ( firm value at end of period)
l = market value of liabilities
brealey et al in their book provide a more practical view on shareholder value 
and state that “shareholder value depends on good investment decisions” and “ … on 
good financing decisions”. below figure taken from their book illustrates these two 
elements along with probing questings to ask (brealey et al., 2015).
Figure 2.: common financial ratios and other measures relate to shareholder value
Financing
How can the firm safely finance future
growth ?
Source: Brealey et al, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 2015, page 84
Shareholder Value




for the coming year ?
Current, quick, and cash ratios
Investment
How profitable ?
Economc value added (EVA)
Returns on capital, assets and equity
Prudent financial leverage ?
Debt ratios
Interest coverage ratios
Profits from sales ?
Operating profit margin
Efficient use of assets ?
Turnover ratio of assets, inventory, 
and receivables
Source: authors.
figure 2. shows how common financial ratios and other measures relate to 
shareholder value. brealey et al, fundamentals of corporate finance, 2015, page 84
taking all of this into account it becomes obvious that shareholder value can be an 
excellent management approach, if its used to its advantage and not as the sole indica-
tor of value add. if not used properly as a management guidance and bonus system for 
top management it may lead to short term optimization of cash flows to boost share-
holder value while harming long term investments (rieg, 2015). being a full promoter 
of the shareholder value approach in his early publications in the 80’s, rappaport in 
his 2005 article states “financial analysts fixate on quarterly earnings at the expense 
of fundamental research. corporate executives … point to the behavious of the invest-
ment community to rationalize their own obsession with earnings. short-termism is 
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the desease; earnings and tracking error are the carriers.” (rappaport, 2005). also 
the calculation as such isn’t as straight forward as it looks like in the formula. for 
instance future risks can and need to be built in by varying the interest factor i, which 
also reflects the uncertainty of future interest rates, therefore the factor i by itself 
could be the source for significant calculation deviations.
2.4. Cash flow and Free cash flow
“the value of a company depends on how much cash it can generate for inves-
tors after it has paid for any new capital investments. this cash is called … free cash 
flow. “ (brealey et al., 2015).
it is obvious that cash cash flows are a very important part, if not the most im-
portant one in defining and judging value add of a firm. as a matter of fact in a recent 
talk with a controller of a medium-sized german stock market listed and fast growing 
company, he said that cash flow is the key financial indicator for him. below formula 
shows how cash flow from operations and free cash flow are calculated.
 
(7)
the importance of cash is also emphasized by dittmar, mahrt-smith “answer 
to question ‘does it matter if firms hold large cash reserves ?’ is yes …” (dittmar and 
mahrt-smith, 2007).
there seems to be also the unified agreement that corporate governance doesn’t 
have much impact on how much cash is generated, that is clearly in the hand of the 
executives “ … governance has a relatively minor impact on how firms accumulate 
cash, but a significant impact on how firms spend their money. “ (dittmar and mah-
rt-smith, 2007). However, the use of available cash seems to be indeed tight to the 
level of corporate governance of a firm “… . show that governance has a substantial 
impact on value through its impact on cash ….(dittmar and mahrt-smith, 2007) 
furthermore they state that “… $1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is value at 
only $ 0.42 to $ 0.88. Good governance approximately doubles this value.” (dittmar 
and mahrt-smith, 2007). also interesting and at the same time not surprising are 
the findings of Harford “… shows that … firms with large cash reserves spend more 
on acquisitions” (Harford, 1999).
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2.5. ROI/ROE/ROA/RONA/ROCE
eVa measures “how many dollars a business is earning after deducting the cost of 
capital.” which means “ the more assets a manager has to work with, the greater the op-
portunity to generate large eVa” (brealey et al., 2015). therefore, additional supporting 
measures are helpful. the most common ones among those are return on capital (roc) 
or return on capital employed (roce) or return on investment (roi) and return on 
equity (roe) ,a s well as return on assets (roa) or return on net assets (rona). 
stiglbauer defines a set of five different financial criteria as endo-gene variables 
to reflect the correlation between corporate governance and corporate success (stigl-
bauer, 2010a). these are return on equity (roe), return on investment (roi) as two 
balance sheet criteria, and two so-called hybrid criteria tobin’s Q and the market to 
book value of equity as well as one stock market related criteria which is return on stock.
mäkelainen see’s these measures critical “ all accounting based rate of returns 
(roi, rona, roce, roic) fail to assess the true or economic return of a firm, be-
cause they are based on the historical asset values, which in turn are distorted by in-
flation and other factors. stewart defines his rate of return as return on beginning 
capital and as return after taxes but these adjustments do not affect the problems at-
tached to accounting rate of return. the shortcomings of accounting rate of returns 
and the current research on the subject are presented in detail in next section. the 
valuation formula of eVa, however is always equivalent to discounted cash flow and 
net present value, if eVa is calculated as stewart presents.” (mäkelainen, 1998).
2.6. ROC - Return on Capital
roc is defined as (brealey et al., 2015) net income plus after-tax interest as a 
percentage of long-term capital.
it is equal to after-tax operating income divided by total capitalization. impor-
tant to know is when calculating roc a so-called flow measure (income over peri-
od of a year) is combined with a snapshot measure (capital at the start of the year). 
therefore it may be a more accurate reflection of realities if the average of the total 
capitalization at the beginning and end of the year is taken. 
2.7. ROA - Return on Assets
roa is defined as net income plus after-tax interest as a percentage of total 
assets.
it measures after-tax operating income as a fraction of the firms total assets. 
total assets equal total liabilities plus shareholders equity are greater than total capi-
talization because total capitalization does not include current liabilities.
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2.8. ROE - Return on Equity
roe s defined as income as a percentage of shareholders equity.
it measures the income to shareholders per dollar they have invested. again to 
ensure flow measures are used consistently it should be taken net income divided by 
average equity.
3. THE USE OF FINANCIAL VALUE ADD MEASURES IN 
PRACTICE - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 30 GERMAN 
DAX LISTED CORPORATIONS 
in order to evaluate the use of financial measures in practice as part of this re-
search, an empirical approach has been chosen. analyzing 2015 annual reports of the 
30 German daX listed companies with the following objectives has been performed.
objectives have been to: 
(1) identify whether and which financial measures are used beyond the standard 
financial reporting needs in order to reflect financial return and value creation 
(2) document the values of these measures by firm
(3) analyze and discuss measures and data 
this empirical analysis is to set the basis for further research as part of a dis-
sertation. below two tables compile and summarize financial measures, first from 
the theoretical part of the paper and, second from the empirical research done. table 
1 takes financial measures and how these are calculated adding commentary to it on 
how its calculated or what advantages or limitations it might have. the fourth column 
then reflects in which 2015 annual report of the German daX 30 corporations the 
respective measure is used, while the last column references literature which is used 
in this paper regarding these financial measures.
3.1. Results of empirical approach
the empirical research unvealed that most of the firms using a true value add 
measure beyond roce, roe or roa are using eVa or an eVa like calculation which 
in both cases they define as their own firm specific value add measure. such exam-
ples are continental Value creation (cVc), thyssenKrupp Value added (tkVa) or 
merck economic Value added (meVa) or simply financial Value add (daimler), 
Value add(ed) (bayer, basf, bmW, eon) or Value creation (Henkel). table 2 shows 
which measure is used by which company, how its calculated and again commentary 
including whether its just a financial metric or value add is used and implemented as 
a management approach to compare different business units with each other or to 
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steer and measure management and teams towards value creation (Henkel, conti-
nental).
Table 1.: financial measures, calculations and use in German daX30 firms 
Financial Measures calculation comments in 2015 annual report Literature
Cash Flow (from Operations) calculated as net income + 
interest + depreciation - 
additions to net working capital 
= cash flow from operations 
The value of a company depends on how much cash it can 
generate.
Beiersdorf AG Annual Report 2015, page 49, 
also covers Net and Free Cash flows / 
Lufthansa Annual Report 2015, page 2 / SAP 
AG Annual Report 2015, page 136 / Bayer 
AG Annual Report 2015, page 3
compare: Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith 2005, pages 
1 and 4 / Brealey et al, Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance, 2015
Free Cash Flow cash flow from operations - 
capital expenditures = free cash 
flow
The value of a company depends on how much cash it can 
generate for investors after it has paid for any new capital 
investments. This is called free cash flow.
Continental AG, Annual Report 2015, pages 
2/13 / Henkel, AR 2015, page 74 / Software 
AG, Annual Report 2015, page 3
compare: Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith 2005, pages 
1 and 4 / Brealey et al, Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance, 2015
Economical Value Add (EVA) EVA=NOPAT - WACC*NOA  
EVA=(ROCE - WACC)*NOA  
E VA has  been developed res ulting from difficulties  of eas e of 
communication of the s hareholder value add. E VA champions  the 
idea a bus ines s  is  only profitable when it creates  wealth and 
returns  for s hareholders , and requires  performance above a 
company's  cos t of capital. The E VA calculation relies  heavily on the 
amount of inves ted capital, and is  bes t us ed for as s et-rich 
companies  that are s table or mature. C ompanies  with intangible 
as s ets , s uch as  technology bus ines s es , may not be good 
candidates  for an E VA evaluation.
Henkel AG, Annual Report 2015, page 71 / 
EON Annual Report 2015, page 50 / Merck 
Annual report 2015 MEVA page 60 / RWE 
Annual report 20165, page 54 / 
ThyssenKrupp Annual Report 2015, page 4
compare: Hilbert , Wertorientierte 
Unternehmensführung, pages 13 ff / Brealey 
et al, Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 
2015
ROA - Return on Assets ROA = (Net income + after-tax 
interest) / total assets.
ROA is a measure to show how well a company uses the available 
assets and how much profit it is able to generate using these 
assets
Fresenius Annual Report 2015, page 3/ 
Infineon Annual Report 2015, page 4
Compare: Kraft et al, 2013, page 15 and 27 
The results show a positive and significant 
relationship between governance and ROA. 
Firms with weaker corporate governance 
are less profitable / Brealey et al, 
Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, 2015, 
page 89
RONA – Return on net assets RONA=Net Income/(fixed 
Assets+net working capital)
the higher RONA is the better is the proftability of a company's 
operations. For longer term considerations one time expenses 
need to taken out of the equation
Compare: Kraft et al, 2013, page 15 and 27 
The results show a positive and significant 
relationship between governance and ROA. 
Firms with weaker corporate governance 
are less profitable
ROE – Return on equity ROE = EBIT / Equity Measure for profitabilty or return on equity Adidas AG Annual Report 2015, page 3 - 
11,2% / Bayer Annual Report 2015, page 3 / 
Deutsche Bank, Annual Report 2015, page 
48 ROAE post-tax return on average active 
equity / Commerzbank Annual Report 2015, 
page 2 - operating return on equity / Daimler 
Annual Report 2015, page 90 / Deutsche 
Börse Annual Report 2015, page 54 / 
Fresenius Annual Report 2015, page 3 
/Infineon Annual Report 2015, page 4
Compare: Stiglbauer 2010, page 130 / 
Brealey et al, Fundamentals of Corporate 
Finance, 2015, page 90
ROCE – Return on capital employed ROCE=EBIT/Capital Employed A higher ROCE indicates more efficient use of total capital. ROCE should 
be higher than the company’s capital cost; otherwise it indicates that the 
company is not employing its capital effectively and is not generating 
shareholder value. ROACE is Return on Average Capital Employed.
Linde AG Annual Report 2015, page 3 - 
ROCE 9,4% / Continental AG page 36, 
ROCE target of 20%, actual 20,9% / Henkel 
AG, Annual Report 2015, page 4 / Lufthansa 
Annual Report 2015, page 2 / EON AG 
Annual Report 2015, pages 49-50 / BMW AG 
page 4 / Siemens Annual Report 2015, page 
9 / Deutsche Telekom Annual Report pages 
11 and 65 / Fresenius Annual Report 2015, 
page 3 / HeidelbergCement Annual Report 
2015, page 81/ Infineon Annual Report 2015, 
pages 4 and 139 / EON Annual Report 2015 
page 50 / Merck Annual report 2015 page 60 
/ RWE Annual report 20165, page 54 / 
ThyssenKrupp Annual Report 2015, page 4
Compare: Brealey et al, Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance, 2015, page 89
ROI – Return on Investment ROI=(gain of invest-cost of 
invest)/cost of invest
Return of total capital invested allows easy comparisons, however 
does inherently not take time into account, so may need to be 
adjusted to same time periods for comparison
Volkswagen AG, Annual Report 2015, page 
3
Compare: Stiglbauer 2010, page 131
Shareholder Value (SHV) SHV = Company value/outside 
capital
A company’s  dis counted projection of future cas h flows  les s  the 
projected total value at the end of the period cons idered. W hile 
s omewaht complicated to calculate it is  a very good management 
approach if not mis us ed to only boos t for s hortterm effects .
compare: Knaup, 2014, page 22 / Hilbert, 
Wertorientierte Unternehmensführung, 
pages 7 ff
Tobin's Q Q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA** Future growth potential as seen by capital market Tobin's Q  is 
defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement 
cost of its assets plus the book value of the firm's long term debt, 
and TA is the book value of the firm’s total assets
Compare: Stiglbauer 2010, page 131 / Kraft 
et al, 2013, pages 15 and 24
Source: own creation.
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Table 2.: Value add measurements as defined and used by German daX30 firms
DAX 30 Firms Value Add 
Measures
calculation comments in 2015 annual report





CVC - Continental Value Contribution based on ROCE, EBIT, 
WACC - part of value driver system, to also compare business 
units
Continental AG, Annual Report 2015, page 
50
EACC (Lufthansa AG) EACC = (Adjusted) EBIT + 
Interest - Tax - WACC
Earnings after Cost of Capital EACC as well as ROCE replacing 
CVA (Cash Value Added = Actual Cash Flow - Minimal needed 
Cash Flow)
Lufthansa Annual Report 2015, page 13
Financial Value Add (Daimler AG) FVA=NOPAT-(NOA*CC%)/CC  
FVA=(ROS*NAP-CC%)*NOA
value added is calculated taking cost of capital as the result of net 
assets and cost of capital expressed as a percentage, which is 
subtracted from earnings
Daimler AG Annual Report 2015, page 77
MEVA (Merck AG) MEVA = ROCE - WACC Merck: ROCE/MEVA as KPIs but no data Merck Annual report 2015 MEVA page 60
NAV Net Assets Value (Vonavia AG) NAV=Equity attributable to 
Vonovia’s shareholders + 
Deferred taxes on investment 
properties and assetsheld for 
sale +/- Fair value of derivative 
financial instruments +/- 
Deferred taxes on derivative 
financial instruments
Growth from operating activities and the value of our property 
assets are two factors that are decisive for the further development 
of our company and that are reflected in the net asset value (NAV) 
– a standard parameter in our sector
Vonovia Annual Report 2015 page 105
Thyssenkrupp Value Added (tkVA) tkVA = EBIT - WACC * CE tkVA is the value created and permits comparison of the financial 
performance of businesses with different capital intensity. tkVA is 
calculated as EBIT minus or plus the cost of capital employed in 
the business. To obtain the cost of capital, capital employed (CE) 
is multiplied by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), 
which includes equity, debt and the interest rate for pension
Thyssenkrupp Annual Report 2015 page 40
Value Creation (Henkel AG) EVA Value creation as corporate approach - Goal of 3x value / footprint 
by 2030 / taking into account EBIT, ROCE, WACC by BU / EVA as 
measure
Henkel Annual Report 2015, page 71
Value add (BASF AG) Value added = Financial 
Performance - (depreciation & 
amortization) - (services 
purchased & energy costs & 
other expenses) - (cost of raw 
materials and merchandize)
Financial performance minus goods and services purchased, 
depreciation and amortization. Business performance includes 
sales revenues, other operating income and interest income, as 
well as income from shareholdings.Value add as company strategy 
reflected in individual employee's goals
BASF Group Annual Report 2015, page 3 / 
page 31: Value Added = EBIT - WACC, 
value add as company strategy reflected in 
individual employee's goals
Value add (Bayer AG) Value Add = total operating 
performance - costs of 
procured goods and services - 
depreciation and amortization
Bayer: value added is defined as the company’s total operating 
performance in the previous fiscal year less the costs of procured 
and consumed goods and services, depreciation and amortization. 
2015 AR, page 67
Bayer AG 2015 Annual Report, page 67
Value Added (BMW AG) VA = earnings - (cost of capital 
rate * capital epmloyed)
the contribution made to business value growth during the financial 
year is measured in terms of “value added”
BMW AG Annual Report 2015, pages 20-21 
and 57
Value Added (EON AG) Value added = (ROACE – cost 
of capital) x average capital 
employed
Value added measures the return that exceeds the cost of capital 
employed
EON AG Annual Report 2015, pages 2 and 
47
Value based management SAP AG SAP - approach of value-based management as stated on page 
63, to target best areas for sustained investments. No specific 
financial measure mentioned in this section.
SAP AG Annual Report 2015, page 63
Source: own creation.
the research shows that while 12 out of the 30 corporations claim value add 
measures or in use only 10 actually do show data. below graph 1 shows how the abso-
lute value add data from these 10 companies trace over the reported ebit/operating 
profit number. While there is a huge spread between value add results in average eve-
ry 10m€ additional ebit result in 15m€ value add. While this on the first glance may 
seem as a contradiction in terms, it becomes clearer by looking at the eVa calculation 
formula with Wacc and assets being important factors of the equation.
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Value Add and EBIT/Operating Profit 
Value added (B€) Linear (Value added (B€))
 
Source: own creation.
With 43% or 13 out of 30 firms the most used metric is roce. tracing roce 
over ebit/operating profit as shown in below figure 4., it shows that the spread 
is way less compared to value add. in average a 1 m€ higher ebit results in a 3,3% 
higher roce. 

















ROCE and EBIT/Operating Profit 
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furthermore 7 out of the 30 firms use roe as metric. figure 5. shows also that 
the highest roe has been achieved with one of the lowest ebit values. obviously this 
is due to the underlying equity values of the different firms and with a low absolute 
equity high roe values are possible as the figure shows. 

















ROE and EBIT/Operating Profit 
ROE (%) Linear (ROE (%))
Source: own creation.
to complete the figure 6. companies are using roa as value measure. again 
plotting roa over ebit/operating profit in figure 6. it shows an average increase of 
1,5% in roa for every 1b€ added in ebit. 

















ROA and EBIT/Operating Profit 
ROA (%) Linear (ROA (%))
Source: own creation.
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out of the 30 daX listed firms 9 are not providing any of the mentioned value 
add data. that is with 30% an unexpected high share. 
this diverged approach to value add measurement is shown in below figure 7. 
While ebit/operating profit naturally shows data points for every firm, the other 
measures don’t. therefore, in below paragraph a correlation analysis is done with 
the intention to identify those measures best suited for value add representation in 
absence of a true value add measure.






































EBIT/OP (B€) ROE (%) ROCE (%) Value added (B€)
DAX 30 ROCE/ROE/Value added compared with EBIT/OP
Source: own creation.
3.2. Correlation analyses
in order to identify those measures best suited to represent value add the fol-
lowing correlation analyses were done.
Table 3.: correlation analyses
Value Add / EBIT correlation
Column 1 Column 2
Column 1 1
Column 2 0,6007916 1
Value Add / ROCE correlation
Column 1 Column 2
Column 1 1
Column 2 0,9737878 1
 
Value Add/ ROA correlation
Column 1 Column 2
Column 1 1
Column 2 -0,998272 1
Source: own creation.
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a Value add / roe correlation has not been performed as there are only two 
datapoints.
the correlation analysis shows that roce obviously correlates best with the 
Value add measure and therefore, in case there is no value add data point available 
roce is a very good replacement indicator. no surprise that 13 out of the 30 daX 
firms are using and stating roce data in their reports.
4. SUMMARY
3 key learnings:
• no consistent approach in terms of using the same metric(s) across 30 daX 
corporations with 30% using value add, 43% roce, 23% roe, 13% roa and 
30% none of these. 
• roce correlates best with the eVa value add measure and is best suited to 
indicate value add in the absence of an eVa measure.
• shareholder value is not used. 
they increasingly take value add as an managerial approach as part of their aim 
to professionalize corporate governance.
Value add 33% , roce 43%, roe 23%, roa 13% , none 30% adding up to more 
than 100% indicates that several firms report multiple metrics while still a high share 
of 30% are not reporting any value add metric at all. two of those are at least referring 
to a value add approach in their firms yet not providing any data.
also, very interesting is that shareholder Value as value metric is not being 
used any more. supposedly that is due to the negative touch in the broader popula-
tion shareholder value still has. However, looking at how its calculated and measured 
along with including mid-term aspects it really provides a very meaningful set of data 
if not the most meaningful. (mauboussin, 2011) 
it also became clear that one measure by itself is not a proper judgement. in 
other words, besides value add, additional metrics must be considered in order to 
be able to truly judge and rate a firms position. most of the mentioned measures are 
periodic measures and can be optimized within the given time period on the expense 
of longer aspects. therefore, its strongly recommended even when looking for value 
creation judgements, besides eVa, roce, roe and roa to take also in considera-
tion the trends of those over several years and minimally include cash flow, cash po-
sition and equity ratio as well as total assets as factors. 
5. FUTURE OUTLOOK
the empirical part of this research paper focuses on daX 30 value add measures 
in 2015 annual reports. it will be interesting to see how it evolves during 2016 and 
2017 which then allows also to see the most actual trends. the future hypothesis is 
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that we won’t see major shifts in the 2016 and 2017 annual reports, however it is ex-
pected that value add becomes more and more important beyond the sheer financial 
measures and metrics. therefore, value based management approaches, reflected in 
management guidance, business unit measurements, employee objectives and exec-
utive’s compensation is what the author believes we will see more going into the next 
years. this research paper provides the basis for the foreseen future comparisons 
and trend analyses. 
With more data from coming year’s reports and from potentially expanding re-
search towards other stock market listed firms the database becomes more signifi-
cant such that a predictive analytics model can be developed allowing to define best-
in-class status.
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